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ON NOT LOVING EVERYONE: COMMENTS ON 
JEAN-LUC NANCY’S “L’AMOUR EN ÉCLATS 
[SHATTERED LOVE]” 
 
Mathew Abbott 
 
 
 
 
And for what, except for you, do I feel love? 1 
 
The essay begins with a warning and a series of questions:  
 
The thinking of love, so ancient, so abundant and diverse 
in its forms and in its modulations, asks for an extreme 
reticence [retenue] as soon as it is solicited. It is a question of 
modesty, perhaps, but it is also a question of exhaustion: 
has not everything been said on the subject of love? Every 
excess and every exactitude? Has not the impossibility of 
speaking about love been as violently recognized as has 
been the experience of love itself as the true source of the 
possibility of speaking in general? We know the words of 
love to be inexhaustible, but as to speaking about love, 
could we perhaps be exhausted?2  
 
Much depends on the first sentence of the next paragraph, which 
functions as a potential rejoinder and answer to this warning and 
these questions: “It might well be appropriate that a discourse on love 
– supposing that it still has something to say – be at the same time a 
communication of love, a letter, a missive” (82; 225f). The possibility 
of speaking about love has been placed in question by the sheer 
volume of texts that purport to do just that (it is a paradox worth 
reflecting on: the fact that something appears to be everywhere means 
                                                                                                 
1 Stevens, “Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction,” 380. 
2 Nancy, “Shattered Love,” 82; “L’amour en éclats,” 225 (citations henceforth 
given in the text; translations are from Garbus and Sawhney unless a foot-
note indicates otherwise). 
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it might be nowhere). Yet exhaustion can be alleviated with a change 
in trajectory: if one cannot speak about love, then one can still speak 
in it (for ‘[w]e know the words of love to be inexhaustible’). That 
Nancy’s essay presents as a treatise on love therefore shows there is 
reflexivity here. This may be more than an essay on love. It may also 
be a declaration of it. Indeed, if it is what it presents itself as, then it 
has to be.  
The claims are being made in the conditional (‘It might well be 
appropriate . . .’ [Et sans doute il conviendrait . . . ]), but this is not 
because of modesty (rhetorical or otherwise). As Nancy writes: 
“[T]he words of love, as is well known, sparsely, miserably repeat 
their one declaration, which is always the same, always already 
suspected of lacking love because it declares it” (82; 226f). A 
declaration of love has a very particular and ambiguous 
epistemological status. It is perhaps more problematic even than the 
kinds of reports more usually associated with the skeptical threats of 
the problem of other minds: if it is true that when “I see someone 
writhing in pain with evident cause I do not think: all the same, his 
feelings are hidden from me,”3 then in love things are complicated. 
Here one can be mistaken in attributing the predicate ‘in love’ to 
oneself (Romeo and Rosaline); here it is not meaningless to say, ‘I 
know I am in love’ (‘How?’ ‘I just know’); here the intensity of an 
affective display can itself cast doubt on what we might presume (or 
hope) it is intended to convey (sometimes the louder you shout it, the 
hollower you sound). Wittgenstein again: “Love is not a feeling. Love 
is put to the test, pain not. One does not say: that was not true pain, 
or it would not have faded so quickly.”4 It is not that love cannot be 
proven save through exceptional actions (gifts, sonnets, extravagant 
marriage proposals, etc.), but rather that this ‘being put to the test’ is 
crucial to it, and persists with it at all times; there is no way of 
proving it once and for all, and so the task it sets is continual. As a 
thought experiment, imagine it were possible to use neuroimaging to 
determine the intensity of feeling a subject has for a certain person. 
Even if one could ‘prove’ scientifically that a particular man or 
woman arouses extreme desire and/or affection in the subject, then 
would this be sufficient to prove love? Are such feelings even 
necessary to love? Could we not, in certain circumstances, 
legitimately speak of it in their absence? Nancy’s essay will try to 
                                                                                                 
3 Wittgenstein, Investigations, §223. 
4 Wittgenstein, Zettel, §504 (translation modified). 
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show that this problem – the fact that love cannot be proven or 
guaranteed – is actually a condition of its possibility. As Catherine 
Kellogg puts it in a piece on Nancy’s thought: “[I]t is the very 
inability to guarantee love – the very ephemerality of the experience 
of loving – that calls forth the promise of love in the first place.”5  
Nancy’s essay turns on this epistemological particularity, which 
makes it rather singular. For the text does not just make a claim about 
love. It makes a claim about being in the light of love. The argument 
is transcendental. To get ahead of ourselves, it says: if there is love 
(and there is: I have declared it), then being is finite. Nancy’s essay 
declares love in order to comment on it, and demonstrates that, 
because there is love, being is in a certain way. Yet that declaration is 
epistemologically ambiguous, because love is not the kind of thing 
that can be definitively proven or achieved (demonstrating it – 
showing it, sustaining it – is an ongoing task). As such, Nancy’s is a 
singular kind of transcendental argument. It is a transcendental 
argument in which one of the lemmas is a promise. We will come back 
to this, for it is arguably the heart of the essay. It shows us something 
important about Nancy’s ontology. 
Let’s return to the text as it develops. In the next paragraphs, 
Nancy invokes once again the reticence required for thinking love, 
but cautions against the idea that it stems the fact that it would be 
“indiscreet to deflower love” (83; 226f). It is not that to write or speak 
of love entails crudeness or a lack of propriety; it does not mean 
debasing something that should really be treated with respectful or 
sacred silence. For love has already been marked in art and literature 
by an “unrestrained and brazen exploitation” [exploitation débridée ou 
éhontée] (83; 226f); and this shamelessness, along with the resultant 
difficulty of moralising about or sermonising on love, are inherent to 
what it is: “charity and pleasure, emotion and pornography, the 
neighbor and the infant, the love of lovers and the love of God, 
fraternal love and the love of art, the kiss, passion, friendship” (83; 
226 – 7f). There is no use pretending otherwise: love gets around. 
Nancy: “To think love would thus demand a boundless generosity 
toward all these possibilities, and it is this generosity that would 
command reticence: the generosity not to choose between loves, not 
to privilege, not to hierarchize, not to exclude” (83; 227f). The last 
thing love needs is to be arranged taxonomically and valued 
accordingly, such that certain of its manifestations are taken to be 
                                                                                                 
5 Kellogg, “Love and Communism,” 345. 
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higher or truer instantiations of its essential principle: if we want to 
understand love, then it would be a mistake to attempt to distinguish 
between loves on the grounds of how authentic, ethical, painful, 
dangerous, healthy, passionate, trite, spiritual, erotic, fidelitous, 
sentimental, possessive, romantic, exploitative, narcissistic, or happy 
they are. Rather, the extreme multiplicity and “indefinite abundance” 
(83; 227f) that marks love is its essential principle.6 The reticence love 
calls for, then, is demanded by the “boundless generosity” (83; 227f) 
one needs in order to think it:  
 
Love in its singularity, when grasped absolutely, is itself 
perhaps nothing but the indefinite abundance of all 
possible loves, and an abandonment to their dissemination, 
indeed to the disorder of these bursts. The thinking of love 
should learn to yield to this abandon: to receive the 
prodigality, the collisions, and the contradictions of love, 
without submitting them to an order that they essentially 
defy (83; 227f).7  
  
At this point, the reflexivity that is so crucial to this essay is pushed 
further. Nancy indicates that the “generous reticence” required here 
“would be no different from the exercise of thought itself” (83; 227f): 
thought, insofar as it “rejects abstraction and conceptualization,” 
insofar as it refuses to “produce the operators of a knowledge” (83 – 
4; 227f), is a practice of openness to something that exceeds it. For 
Nancy, as for the later Heidegger, thought does not master its object; 
rather, it “undergoes an experience, and lets the experience inscribe 
itself” (84; 227f). This ‘letting’ [laisse] is important: like Heidegger’s 
Gelassenheit, it links the practice of thought with acceptance and 
                                                                                                 
6 Nancy writes: “[Love] is not in any one of its shatters, or it is always on the 
way to not being there. Its unity, or its truth as love, consists only in this 
proliferation, in this indefinite luxuriance of its essence – and this essence 
itself at once gives itself and flees itself in the crossing of this profusion. Pure 
love refuses orgasm, the seducer laughs at adoration – blind to the fact that 
they each pass through the other, even though neither stops in the other... 
[L]ove is not ‘polymorphous,’ and it does not take on a series of disguises. It 
does not withhold its identity behind its shatters: it is itself the eruption of 
their multiplicity, it is itself their multiplication in one single act of love, it is 
the trembling of emotion in a brothel, and the distress of a desire within fra-
ternity” (102; 256f). 
7 Translation slightly modified.  
ABBOTT – ON NOT LOVING EVERYONE 
143 
receptivity. Yet Nancy goes perhaps further than Heidegger in 
asserting that thought, which “does not lay claim to a particular 
register of thinking” but rather “invites us to thinking as such” (84; 
227f), is love. As he writes: “It is the love for that which reaches 
experience; that is to say, for that aspect of being that gives itself to be 
welcomed” (84; 227f). Thinking love requires generosity, receptivity, 
and openness to something in excess of the thinker – which is to say 
it requires love. 
So there is a double reflexivity at work in this essay. Not only 
does it have to declare love in order to think it, but this thinking must 
itself be carried out as love. This heady confluence of practice and 
theory can help explain some of the formal characteristics of the piece 
which, if we are to believe its claims, will actually need to 
performatively enact them. Given its repeated insistence on the 
multiplicitous nature of love, then, it is appropriate that it achieves 
this through a variety of means: its refusal to find in any of the 
various figures of love that it traces a paradigmatic image of it;8 its 
collapse in its postscript into a strange Blanchotian dialogue (which 
indicates once again that a text on love might also have to be a 
communication of it) 9 ; its insistence, and this is inherent in the 
contradictory movements of the text as its argument develops, that 
the nature of its object is such that any full possession of it would 
actually represent its loss; 10  its reliance on quotations from and 
references to an eclectic range of philosophical and literary sources (a 
formal technique that recalls Benjamin’s Passagenwerk). The text is not 
                                                                                                 
8 Nancy writes: “. . . love’s ultimate paradox, untenable and nevertheless 
inevitable, is that its law lets itself be represented simultaneously by figures 
like Tristan and Isolde, Don Juan, or Baucis and Philemon – and that these 
figures are neither the types of a genre nor the metaphors of a unique reality, 
but rather so many bursts [éclats] of love, which reflect love in its entirety each 
time without ever imprisoning it or holding it back” (101; 254f). 
9 See 108 – 9; 267-8f. 
10 Nancy writes: “There is not one philosophy that has escaped this double 
constraint. In each, love occupies place that is at once evident and dissimulat-
ed (as, in Descartes, between the theory of union and that of admiration), or 
embarrassed and decisive (as, in Kant, in the theory of sublime reason), or 
essential and subordinate (as, in Hegel, in the theory of the State). At the cost 
of these contradictions and evasions, love consistently finds the place that it 
cannot not have, but it only finds it at this cost. What we would have to un-
derstand is why this place is essential for it, and why it is essential to pay this 
price” (86; 230f).  
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only a philosophical treatise on love, but also an attempt at a kind of 
multiplicitous exposure of it; like love itself, Nancy’s essay “offers 
finitude in its truth; it is finitude’s dazzling presentation” (99; 251f). 
This ultra-reflexivity – which requires of the essay this intertwining of 
content and form, of philosophical claims and their enactment – is 
part of what makes it beguiling. 
None of this entails that the affects we associate with love are 
necessarily appropriate to thought. It is not that to think in Nancy’s 
sense of the term requires any particular feeling(s) of the thinker, 
whether they are taken either as a condition for, or simple 
epiphenomenon of, thinking. Love is not a feeling. Rather it is a 
simultaneous opening and obliging of the self: an opening of the self 
to something that exceeds it and an obliging of the self to that excess. 
To say that thinking is love, then, is not to expound any kind of 
irrationalism (such that, for instance, thinking would necessarily 
mean being intoxicated, giddy, exalted, etc.). As Nancy puts it: “To 
say that ‘thinking is love’ does not mean that love can be understood 
as a response to the question of thinking – and certainly not in the 
manner of a sentimental response, in the direction of a unifying, 
effusive, or orgiastic doctrine of thinking” (84; 228f). Instead, the 
obligation appropriate to love is also appropriate to thought. It is not 
exactly an ‘ethical’ obligation, at least in the mainstream philosophical 
sense of the term (after all, it is possible to be in love and to be 
‘unethical’; indeed it is possible to be in love and to be evil – and 
sometimes love provokes it).11 It is an obligation in the etymological 
sense of the word, which derives from the Latin ligāre, meaning ‘to 
bind’ (think of our ‘ligature,’ or the speculative etymology of the term 
‘religion’ as that which binds the human to the divine). Love/thought 
ties one to what one loves/thinks. As Nancy writes: “[I]t is necessary 
to say that ‘thinking is love’ is a difficult, severe thought that promises 
rigor rather than effusion” (84; 228f). Love/thought asks something of 
the lover/thinker; to engage in it is to be tested. Nancy’s is not a 
sentimental or flabbily relativistic thinking. 
                                                                                                 
11 Nancy writes: “(It is perhaps that – a hypothesis that I leave open here – in 
love and in hate, but according to a regime other than that of Freudian am-
bivalence, there would not be a reversal from hate to love, but in hate I 
would be traversed by the love of another whom I deny in his alterity. Ulti-
mately, I would be traversed by this negation. This would be the limit of 
love, but still its black glimmer. Perverse acts of violence, or the cold rage to 
annihilate, are not hate)” (102; 255 – 6f). 
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 Implicit in this Heideggerian turn toward the category of 
‘thought’ is a claim about philosophy. It is not quite that philosophy is 
opposed to thought. It is that it is possible to carry on something that 
resembles philosophy in the absence of thought; that philosophy can 
be (and has been) tempted to forgo thinking. It does so to the extent 
that it is an expression of the will to mastery. Philosophy doesn’t 
think when it refuses the receptivity and risk inherent in thought, 
when it fails to maintain itself in relation to an excess, when it tries to 
reduce everything to knowledge.12 Yet philosophy is not always or 
essentially the will to mastery. Indeed philosophy’s name points to 
this ambiguity: if it is the love of wisdom, it is not the arrival at 
wisdom, nor is it the knowledge of it. Nancy: “The intimate 
connivance between love and thinking is present in our very origins: 
the word ‘philosophy’ betrays it. Whatever its legendary inventor 
might have meant by it, ‘philosophy,’ in spite of everything – and 
perhaps in spite of all philosophies – means this: love of thinking, 
since thinking is love” (84; 227-8f). The double aspect of philosophy 
invoked here is crucial: philosophy is love, but only perhaps in spite 
of philosophies. If the practice of philosophy results in a ‘worldview,’ 
or a reasoned commitment to a set of theses (about mind, meaning, 
metaphysics, morals, or whatever), then philosophy doesn’t think; if 
however philosophy admits its obligation toward what exceeds 
knowledge, then perhaps it can be worthy of what we call it. 
Love/thought is foundational for, yet always in danger of being 
denied by, philosophy.  
The Symposium is paradigmatic here. On the one hand, the work 
“signifies first that for Plato the exposition of philosophy . . . is not 
possible without the presentation of philosophic love” (85; 229f). 
Generously welcoming “all the different kinds of love,” the work 
presents the Eros proper to philosophy not “with the mastery of a 
triumphant doctrine” but rather “in a state of deprivation and 
                                                                                                 
12 Descartes provides an image of this: “[O]pening the thorax of a young live 
rabbit and displacing the ribs so that the heart and trunk of the aorta are 
exposed, I then tied the aorta with a thread at a certain distance from the 
heart, and separated it from everything adhering to it, so that there could be 
no suspicion that any blood or spirit could flow into it from anywhere but the 
heart; then with a scalpel I made an incision between the heart and the liga-
ture, and I saw with the greatest clarity [manifestissime] blood leaving in a spurt 
through the incision when the heart was extending, while, when it was con-
tracted, the blood did not flow” (quoted in Grene, “The Heart and Blood,” 
328). 
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weakness, which allows the experience of the limit, where thought 
takes place, to be recognized” (85; 229-30f); in this text, Plato 
“touches the limits” and presents his thought with a “reticence 
[retenue] not always present elsewhere” (85; 230f). 13  On the other 
hand, however, “the Symposium also exercises a mastery over love” 
(85; 229f): it introduces “choices of philosophical knowledge” and a 
“truth regarding love” that “assigns its experience and hierarchizes its 
moments” (85; 230f). So the work takes away with one hand what it 
gives with the other; it deigns to open its discourse to the multiplicity 
of love, but recoils from that multiplicity, “substituting the impatience 
and conatus of desire for its joyous abandon” (85-6; 230f): “[I]n Plato, 
thinking will have said and will have failed to say that it is love – or 
to explain what this means” (86; 230f). This ambivalence, here 
displayed in one of philosophy’s foundational texts, marks the 
tradition’s inheritance of love. Philosophy needs it, but fails again and 
again to display the generous reticence it demands. As Nancy writes: 
“If thinking is love, that would mean (insofar as thinking is confused 
with philosophy) that thinking misses its own essence – that it misses 
by essence its own essence” (91; 237f).  
This immanent critique of the tradition of philosophy, in which 
the discourse appears as engaged in a flirtation with mastery and 
security that would, if consummated, represent the denial of its own 
condition of possibility, places Nancy’s essay firmly in the post-
Heideggerian tradition of the critique of metaphysics. Nancy, we 
might say, here reads the Heideggerian history of (the forgetting of) 
being in terms of a “missed rendezvous” (91; 238f) between 
philosophy and love. As Linnell Secomb points out, it reminds in 
particular of Levinas, whose own work can be understood as an 
attempt at opening philosophy to an experience of difference and 
exposure that had been haunting it all along. “Nancy’s loving 
philosophy,” Secomb writes, “is indebted in part, and perhaps most of 
all, to Levinas – a debt, a gift, a legacy that Nancy lovingly announces 
through an exposition of Levinas and an exposure of his own thought 
to that of Levinas.” 14  But of course, Levinas’s own relation to 
Heidegger was nothing if not ambivalent, and Nancy’s own post-
Heideggerian reception of Levinas returns the ambivalent favour. 
First we should note that Nancy’s evocation of Levinas in this essay 
(which takes place in an extended parenthetical remark) itself begins 
                                                                                                 
13 Translations modified. 
14 Secomb, “Amorous Politics,” 452. 
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with a sort of warning: “I will be even less explicit with Levinas than 
with Heidegger” (104; 260f). Secomb takes this as a kind of discretion 
(“in a Derridean ethical manner he does not return the gift – through 
eulogy, or dutiful discipleship, for example – and instead disseminates 
the gift of Levinasian ethics”)15, arguing that Nancy’s engagement 
with Levinas is “both a critique and a further elaboration.”16 Yet the 
critique runs deeper than Secomb seems to acknowledge – and the 
‘elaboration,’ if it is that, is one that calls into question a crucial aspect 
of Levinas’s philosophy. As Secomb recognises, what Nancy finds 
problematic in Levinas is the tendency toward teleology on display in 
his works in relation to love, which allows him to hierarchise loves 
according to the kind of taxonomic procedure Nancy wants to 
criticise (Nancy speaks of the “the oriented sequence” that Levinas, 
“in a rather classical manner,” sets up between “fecundity, filiation, 
and fraternity” (105; 260f)). What we need to recognise, however, is 
that the teleology at work in Levinas (or at least, in the Levinas of the 
early works, up to and including Totality and Infinity), is the flipside to 
his sequential phenomenology, which traces the experience of the self 
as it moves from the clutches of the pure fact of being, understood as 
a totality without content (the anonymous il y a),17 toward the other. 
For Levinas, subjectivity begins in the impersonal and moves toward 
ethical experience. As he says at the outset of Time and the Other, “it is 
toward a pluralism that does not merge into unity that I should like to 
make my way and, if this can be dared, break with Parmenides.”18 Or 
                                                                                                 
15 Secomb, “Amorous Politics,” 452. 
16 Secomb, “Amorous Politics,” 452. 
17  Toward the beginning of Time and the Other, Levinas provides a useful 
thought experiment to explain the concept of the il y a [there is]: “Let us imag-
ine all things, beings and persons, returning to nothingness. What remains 
after this imaginary destruction of everything is not something, but the fact 
that there is [il y a]. The absence of everything returns as a presence, as the 
place where the bottom has dropped out of everything, an atmospheric densi-
ty, a plenitude of the void, or the murmur of silence. There is, after this de-
struction of things and beings, the impersonal ‘field of forces’ of existing. 
There is something that is neither subject nor substantive. The fact of existing 
imposes itself when there is no longer anything. And it is anonymous: there 
is neither anyone nor anything that takes this existence upon itself. It is im-
personal like ‘it is raining’ or ‘it is hot.’ Existing returns no matter with what 
negation one dismisses it. There is, as the irremissibility of pure existing” 
(Levinas, Time and the Other, 46-47). 
18 Levinas, Time and the Other, 42 (my emphasis). 
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as he puts it in Totality and Infinity: “[W]e can proceed from the 
experience of totality back to a situation where totality breaks up, a 
situation that conditions the totality itself.” 19  Crucially, the whole 
analysis is predicated upon an equation between being as such and an 
impersonal, anonymous force that must be evaded for the sake of the 
other. And this is precisely what Nancy will challenge in Levinas, 
both in his rather subtle parenthetical note, and implicitly but 
consistently in the essay at large: 
 
[I]n the es gibt (“it gives [itself]”) of Being, one can see 
everything except “generality.” There is the “each time,” an-
archic . . .  occurrence of a singular existing. There is no 
existing without existents, and there is no “existing” by itself, 
no concept – it does not give itself – but there is always 
being, precise and hard, the theft of generality. Being is at 
stake there, it is in shatters [en éclats], offered dazzling, 
multiplied, shrill and singular, hard and cut across: its 
being is there . . . This takes place before the face and 
signification. Or rather, this takes place on another level: at 
the heart of being (105; 261f).20 
 
Nancy is alluding here to Levinas’s essay Existence and Existents; the 
argument is intended to call its foundational concept – that of the il y 
a, or the pure fact of being without beings – into question. Nancy’s 
ontology is geared from the outset toward a thinking (loving?) of 
being in which this image of a radically impersonal being-in-general is 
undermined in its very ground. Levinas’s teleology of love is 
problematic not just because it misses the essentially multiplicitous 
nature of its object, then, but also because missing this multiplicity 
means missing what love has to show about being. Love shows us 
that what takes place before ‘the face and signification’ is not the 
brute totality of a there is (which Levinas will figure in terms of a 
“condemnation to being”),21 but rather a there is that is always already 
plural: “[B]eing-with takes place only according to the occurrence of 
being, or its posing into shatters [éclats]. And the crossing – the 
coming-and-going, the comings-and-goings of love – is constitutive of 
that occurrence” (105; 261f). The multiplicity proper to love is 
                                                                                                 
19 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 24. 
20 Translation modified.  
21 Levinas, Existence and Existents, 24. 
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nothing other than the multiplicity of being itself. As it is exposed, 
love exposes being as shattered. 
It would be wrong to take this talk of ‘shattering’ (a necessarily 
imperfect rendering of the French éclater, which possesses further 
connotations of bursting, brilliance, shining, and sparking) to imply 
that being is whole before being broken in the experience of love, that 
love’s shattering shatters a totality. Rather, this shattering has to be 
understood as originary: being is always already shattered; to put it a 
little awkwardly, we might say that the shard precedes the break. This 
is how Nancy avoids the Levinasian problematic of 
phenomenologically demonstrating how multiplicity enters into a self-
contained, irremissibly monolithic being (and thus also the basic 
problem associated with this: that the multiplicity he establishes 
remains haunted by that monolith).22 In another work, Nancy writes: 
“That which, for itself, depends on nothing is an absolute. That which 
nothing completes in itself is a fragment. Being or existence is an 
absolute fragment.”23 The fragments or shards in play here are not 
pieces of some larger puzzle; rather they are absolutely fragmentary, 
and do not refer back to some prior whole. Being’s multiplicity is not 
the result of its lacking unity; it is absolute in its plurality, completely 
incomplete. Existence is ‘infinitely finite.’ 24  Nancy wants to 
undermine the idea of pure presence that runs through the early 
Levinas; he invokes love in order to show (or rather, to promise) that 
being is never a brute totality.  
He argues something similar of the self. In love, the self finds 
itself to be broken, shattered, and intruded into. If I return to myself 
in the experience of love (and importantly, Nancy does not deny that 
love involves a kind of self-return or self-appropriation),25  then “I 
return broken: I come back to myself, or I come out of it, broken 
[brisé]” (96; 247f). If I am in love, then I lose my self (I lose my self 
possession); if I am in love, then I find myself, but I find myself to be 
mortal, finite, and exposed to something that exceeds me. In love I 
                                                                                                 
22 See Critchley, Very Little... Almost Nothing, 89 – 93. 
23 Nancy, The Sense of the World, 152. 
24 See Nancy, The Sense of the World, 29 – 33. 
25 Nancy writes: “Love frustrates the simple opposition between economy 
and noneconomy. Love is precisely – when it is, when it is the act of a singu-
lar being, of a body, of a heart, of a thinking – that which brings an end to 
the dichotomy between the love in which I lose myself without reserve and 
the love in which I recuperate myself, to the opposition between gift and 
property” (96; 246f). 
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find myself to have lost myself. As Kellogg puts it, “What the other 
(who we love) presents to us, Nancy argues, is the fact of her 
existence, which is to say, a being whose mortality and finiteness, 
calls us to know our own.”26 Love is only possible (if it is possible – 
this is only a promise, after all) between finite, mortal creatures. This 
is to say that immortals could not love each other (this is perhaps part of 
what our literary, cinematic, and popular cultural traditions evoke 
with their images of the vampire: all desire, no love – and condemned 
to the continual torture of that). 27 We could say that lovers share 
their finitude, as long as this ‘sharing’ in understood in an 
appropriately rigorous way: not as the ‘sharing’ of feelings or 
experiences, as certain debased contemporary discourses would have 
it, but the sharing of an exposure to something excessive, absolutely 
inappropriable (and of course, as lovers know, there is pain in this). 
Some of the most beautiful passages of Nancy’s essay are dedicated to 
a description of how love exposes the self’s finitude to itself, and to 
the other: 
 
[T]he break is a break in his self-possession as subject; it is, 
essentially, an interruption of the process of relating oneself 
to oneself outside of oneself. From then on, I is constituted 
broken. As soon as there is love, the slightest act of love, the 
slightest spark, there is this ontological fissure that cuts 
                                                                                                 
26 Kellogg, “Love and Communism,” 344. 
27 This pits Nancy against Alain Badiou, who analyses love in terms of the 
Subject’s (or rather Subjects’) fidelity to the event of love; a move that, as he 
makes clear in his Ethics, renders the loving Subject immortal in a certain im-
portant sense. As Badiou writes: “The fact that in the end we all die, that 
only dust remains, in no way alters Man’s identity as immortal at the instant 
in which he affirms himself as someone who runs counter to the temptation 
of wanting-to-be-an-animal to which circumstances may expose him. And we 
know that every human being is capable of being this immortal - unpredicta-
bly, be it in circumstances great or small, for truths important or secondary. 
In each case, subjectivation is immortal, and makes Man. Beyond this there is 
only a biological species, a ‘biped without feathers’, whose charms are not 
obvious” (Badiou, Ethics, 12). While the ethic of fidelity that Badiou con-
structs displays certain similarities with Nancy’s idea of love as kind of ongo-
ing promise without guarantee, the distinction here is clear: Badiou’s ‘Subject’ 
is marked by its having been able to rise above the everyday, ordinary, finite 
world of mortals. For Nancy, on the other hand, love can only happen to a 
finite self, and only exists because being as such is finite.  
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across and that disconnects the elements of the subject-
proper – the fibers of its heart. One hour of love is enough, 
one kiss alone, provided that it is out of love – and can 
there, in truth, be any other kind? Can one do it without 
love, without being broken into, even if only slightly? (96; 
247f)  
  
The temporal progression implied here, however, is something of an 
analytical fiction. Just as with being, it is not that love breaks the 
unity of the self, or shatters it, or intrudes upon it: rather, it reveals 
the self as always already broken, multiplicitious, shattered. As Nancy 
acknowledges (a few paragraphs later, in parentheses): “[T]he heart is 
not broken, in the sense that it does not exist before the break . . .  it 
is the break itself that makes the heart” (99; 250f). What I love is the 
other’s impropriety, the fact that it does not have a hold on itself. But 
it is not as though my love renders the other finite in this way. 
Rather, it reveals it as such. Or still more accurately, it reveals me as 
such as it reveals the other as such, and one for the other in a kind of 
mutual astonishment.   
Nancy unifies these two claims – the claim about being, and the 
claim about the heart of the self – via a striking image/metaphor, the 
precise status of which is rather enigmatic: 
 
Again it is necessary that being have a heart, or still more 
rigorously, that being be a heart. “The heart of being” 
means nothing but the being of being, that by virtue of 
which it is being. To suppose that “the being of being,” or 
“the essence of being,” is an expression endowed with 
meaning, it would be necessary to suppose that the essence 
of being is something like a heart – that is to say: that 
which alone is capable of love (88; 234f).28 
 
How are we to take the claim that it is necessary that being be a heart? 
It would be uncharitable to simply regard this as a poetic flourish on 
Nancy’s part, as a ‘literary’ device, affectation, or simple attempt at 
                                                                                                 
28 How striking that this comes from a philosopher who, five years after the 
publication of the essay, would have his own heart transplanted. What an 
uncanny confirmation of the lack of self-possession that Nancy posits as es-
sential to (the heart of) being! 
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ornamentation: if this is a metaphor, then it should be more than 
‘just’ a metaphor. We need to take it seriously; but how? Here it is 
worth acknowledging that Nancy’s statement here is made in the 
subjunctive [que l'être soit un coeur – his emphasis]. It indicates that we 
are returning to the theme of the promise.  
For Nancy, ‘I love you’ is the most authentic name for love 
itself. It is not simply a constative statement, in that it doesn’t just pick 
out a fact about the world (say the presence in me of certain strong 
feelings). Rather it also does something: it is itself an event, not just a 
description of one. But neither (to continue in this Austinian register) 
is it a standard performative. While saying ‘I pronounce you man 
and wife’ is clearly an action – namely, the act of pronouncing – the 
status of ‘I love you’ is more ambiguous. Does saying it mean doing it 
in this case? What, besides sincerity, are the felicity conditions of this 
performative? At issue is the nature of the ‘act’ in question – is it 
really something that happens once, like the pronouncement of 
marriage? If I say ‘I pronounce you man and wife,’ and the power 
really is invested in me, then you become man and wife; if I say ‘I 
love you,’ then do I really love you? Even if I am sincere, I can still 
be wrong. There are other ways of loving besides saying ‘I love you,’ 
yet one cannot pronounce except by pronouncing. ‘I love you,’ then, 
is a singular kind of statement, one that seems to exist in a zone of 
indistinction between the constative and the performative. For Nancy, 
it is a sort of promise, and one of a particular sort. It is a promise on 
which I am, in a certain fundamental sense, unable to fully make 
good (for what would constitute its having been kept?). “The 
promise,” Nancy writes, “neither describes nor prescribes nor 
performs. It does nothing and thus is always in vain. But it lets a law 
appear, the law of the given word: that this must be” (100; 253f). A 
lack of guarantee thus marks the promise of love: “The promise must 
be kept, and nonetheless love is not the promise plus the keeping of 
the promise. It cannot be subjected in this way to verification, to 
justification, and to accumulation . . . Perhaps unlike all other 
promises, one must keep only the promise itself: not its ‘contents’ 
(‘love’), but its utterance (‘I love you’)” (100; 253f).29   
                                                                                                 
29 Nancy has returned to this in Dis-Enclosure: The Deconstruction of Christianity, 
where he reads the promise without guarantee essential to love in terms of 
the “Christian category of faith” (152): “What I am saying here would be 
perfectly suitable to our modern definition of faithfulness in love. It is precise-
ly that, for us – faithfulness in love, if we conceive of faithfulness as distinct 
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This can explain why Nancy turns to the subjunctive in his claim 
about being: to say that it is necessary that being be a heart is not the 
same as saying that it necessarily is a heart. It’s not that being is a 
heart, but that it has to be. To say that it is necessary that being be a 
heart is to promise that being is singular and exposed, that it is not the 
brute generality that horrifies Levinas, but rather a plurality that 
exceeds our attempts at mastering it. If being is a heart, then it is 
because of a groundlessness at its heart, the fact that it exposes itself 
as depending on no law, no foundation. The lack of guarantee that 
defines love is essential to being as such. Nancy: 
 
What appears in [the light of love], at once excessive and 
impeccable, what is offered like a belly, like a kissed 
mouth, is the singular being insofar as it is this ‘self’ that is 
neither a subject nor an individual nor a communal being, 
but that – she or he – which cuts across, that which arrives 
and departs. The singular being affirms even better its 
absolute singularity, which it offers only in passing, which 
it brings about immediately in the crossing. What is offered 
through the singular being – through you or me, across 
this relation that is only cut across – is the singularity of 
being, which is to say: that being itself, ‘being’ taken 
absolutely, is absolutely singular (108; 265f).  
 
The claim that it is necessary that being be a heart folds Nancy’s claim 
about being into his claim about the self. Both are thus posited as 
simultaneously singular and plural, the ‘that it is’ of each cutting across 
the other. Astonishment at my lover, and astonishment with her; 
astonishment at being, and astonishment with it – and all these 
astonishments bound up together, impossible to tell apart. This 
positing of the self/being as a heart is a promising, and its lack of 
                                                                                                 
from the simple observation of conjugal law or of a moral or ethical law out-
side the conjugal institution. This is even, perhaps, what we mean more pro-
foundly by love, if love is primarily related to faithfulness, and if it is not that 
which overcomes its own failings but rather that which entrusts itself to what 
appears to it as insufficiency... This is why the true correlate of Christian 
faith is not an object but a word... our amorous faith is entirely Christian, 
since, as faithfulness, it entrusts itself to the word of other, to the word that 
says ‘I love you,’ or doesn’t event say it” (153). 
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guarantee is essential (one can’t be astonished by the appearance of a 
link a causal chain).  
What love shows – if it exists – is that there is something in 
being that is more than being. It exposes excess at and as the heart of 
it. And there is no demonstrating it outside of a love/thought whose 
condition of possibility is this very lack of epistemic assurance, this 
impossibility of definitive demonstration. If love exists, then it is 
because being is (infinitely) finite, but we cannot show or be finally 
justified in our (true) belief that it exists. To love/think is to testify to 
the existence of something withdrawn from knowledge, to maintain 
oneself in relation to an excess that, from the perspective of certain 
discourses, is properly invisible. Indeed to Nancy’s list – “sexology, 
marriage counseling, newsstand novels, and moral edification” (102; 
257f) – we might add evolutionary psychology, and perhaps 
‘romance’ reality television: the first unsentimentally refusing the 
distinction between love and desire, reading love as the simple 
expression of desires inherited as the result of adaptive processes; the 
second sentimentalising them both, reading them as the expression of 
some private, unique, confessing, entertaining self. Both miss love, 
because both reduce it to the existence or non-existence of a certain 
state of affairs. They miss the groundlessness that is essential to it, 
and because of it.   
Missing love in this way, these discourses miss the only possible 
site of community. This is not because love is the principle or ground 
of community (such that our being-together would necessarily be a 
kind of loving). It is because love and community share a condition of 
possibility in the groundlessness of being. In “The Inoperative 
Community,” which is the title essay from the collection of English 
translations in which “Shattered Love” also appears, Nancy uses the 
concept of désoeuvrement [inoperativity] to get at this groundlessness. It 
is useful to understand it as a response to Bataille, who is Nancy’s key 
interlocutor in this essay because of his lifelong obsession with tracing 
a mode of exposure that would be irreducible to intersubjectivity, 
relations of exchange, and every form of sociality; Nancy finds in 
Bataille an ally in the struggle to locate “a place of community at once 
beyond social divisions and beyond subordination to technopolitical 
dominion, and thereby beyond such wasting away of liberty, of 
speech, or of simple happiness as comes about whenever these 
become subjugated to the exclusive order of privatization.”30 At the 
                                                                                                 
30 “The Inoperative Community,” 1. 
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same time, however, Nancy discovers a certain limit to Bataille’s 
thinking here, a certain tendency to oppose to society an immanentist 
figure of communal fusion thought in terms of the attainment or 
production of common being. For Nancy, Bataille was tempted by a 
nostalgic image of community – understood according to an image of 
ecstatic union, an orgiastic being-together – as something that we 
have lost in modernity (thus he remains stuck opposing Gesellschaft 
with Gemeinschaft – something that Nancy, despite his commitment to 
thinking community, obstinately refuses).31 This would be the source 
of his “fascination with fascism” (which is itself a “grotesque or abject 
resurgence of an obsession with communion”).32 And because of the 
link between the project of communal fusion and death (“political or 
collective enterprises dominated by a will to absolute immanence,” 
writes Nancy, “have as their truth the truth of death”),33 it would also 
be the source of his being “haunted . . . by the idea that a human 
sacrifice should seal the destiny of the secret community of 
Acéphale.”34 The difference between community and communion is 
fundamental here; for Nancy, the latter is a violent and dangerous 
parody of the former. But of course Bataille, the thinker who “for a 
long time . . . had represented archaic societies, their sacred 
structures, the glory of military and royal societies, the nobility of 
feudalism, as bygone and fascinating forms of a successful intimacy of 
being-in-common with itself,” eventually “came to understand the 
                                                                                                 
31 For Nancy, it is not that in capitalist modernity relations of exchange and 
domination uprooted and destroyed a previously existing community. What 
existed before the rise of capital was something else entirely, something for 
which “have no name or concept” (11). Nancy writes: “Community has not taken 
place, or rather, if it is indeed certain that humanity has known (or still knows, 
outside of the industrial world) social ties quite different from those familiar 
to us, community has never taken place along the lines of our projects of it 
according to these different social forms. It did not take place for the 
Guayaqui Indians, it did not take place in an age of huts; nor did it take place 
in the Hegelian “spirit of a people” or in the Christian agape. No Gesellschaft 
has come along to help the State, industry, and capital dissolve a prior Ge-
meinschaft... community, far from being what society has crushed or lost, is 
what happens to us – question, waiting, event, imperative – in the wake of society” 
(11).   
32 “The Inoperative Community,” 16-17. 
33 “The Inoperative Community,” 12. 
34 “The Inoperative Community,” 16-17. 
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ridiculous nature of all nostalgia for communion.” 35  It is this 
ambivalence that interests Nancy, the way Bataille wavered on the 
edge of a concept of community that would resist both the 
“problematics of sociality or intersubjectivity” 36  and the image of 
community as fusion, community understood as a “work of death.”37 
This is what Nancy means when he writes that “what he thus had to 
think at his limit is what he leaves for us to think in our turn.” 38 
Bataille’s thinking is crucial for Nancy because it splits on the very 
distinction that he wants to clarify; despite its nostalgic tendencies, it 
testifies to “the dissolution, the dislocation . . .  the unsurpassable 
conflagration of community”39 that marks our time. This, then, is the 
significance of the concept of désoeuvrement. The capitalist spectacle, we 
might say, refuses the worklessness at the heart of community (and 
indeed, sets us to work as it does so), privatising the experience of 
finitude such that it simply collapses into senselessness. On the other 
hand, the nostalgic, orgiastic reduction of community that tempted 
Bataille is meant above all to make a work of death, to make death 
“the work of common life” and grant it a total sense. Nancy goes on: 
“And it is this absurdity, which is at bottom an excess of meaning, an 
absolute concentration of the will to meaning, that must have dictated 
Bataille’s withdrawal from communitarian enterprises.” 40  Thus for 
Nancy Bataille’s eventual renunciation of the nostalgia that marked 
his obsession with community must have stemmed from the 
acknowledgment that community is workless in an essential sense; that 
community is precisely that which resists all our attempts at setting life 
and death to work in the constitution of shared meaning. This follows 
from Nancy’s decision to think from out of a proper confrontation 
with the finitude of being: it is in the openness of being, its lack of 
grounding in any substantial or metaphysical principle, that we 
experience the mutual exposure that is community. If the spectacle is 
blind to this openness, obscuring it behind the ideological 
metaphysics of the private individual, then fascism rages to close it.   
 
                                                                                                 
35 “The Inoperative Community,” 17. 
36 “The Inoperative Community,” 14 
37 “The Inoperative Community,” 17. 
38 “The Inoperative Community,” 25. 
39 “The Inoperative Community,” 1. 
40 “The Inoperative Community,” 17.  
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Crucial for us is how the image of communion that haunted Bataille 
was entwined with an image of love. And of course, Bataille thought 
love in terms of absolute loss and expenditure, as a limit experience 
that lacerates the self and exposes it to an outside that it cannot 
accommodate. Thus community emerges in his thought as dependent 
“on the sharing of nocturnal terrors and the kind of ecstatic spasms 
that are spread by death.”41 As he put it in his final address to the 
Collège de Sociologie in July 1939:  
 
The sacrificial laceration that opens the festival is a 
liberating laceration. The individual who participates in 
loss is obscurely aware that this loss engenders the 
community that supports him. But a desirable woman is 
necessary to he who makes love, and it is not always easy 
to know if he makes love in order to be united with her, or 
if he uses her because of his need to make love. In the 
same way, it is difficult to know to what extent the 
community is but the favorable occasion for a festival and 
a sacrifice, or to what extent the festival and the sacrifice 
bear witness to the love individuals give to the 
community.42 
  
Thinking community according to the image of lovers means 
subjecting them both to a logic of sacrifice. Love becomes a work of 
death, taking death as its very paradigm (“love,” Bataille writes, 
“expresses a need for sacrifice: each unity much lose itself in some 
other, which exceeds it”),43 and community appears as constituted on 
the basis of a sacrificial laceration that bears more than a passing 
resemblance to “sexual laceration.”44 Bataille effects a collapse of the 
                                                                                                 
41 Bataille, “Nietzschean Chronicle” 208; Nancy quotes this passage without 
comment in “The Inoperative Community” (34). 
42 Bataille, “The College of Sociology,” 251. 
43 Bataille, “The College of Sociology,” 250. 
44 Bataille, “The College of Sociology,” 251. Nancy identifies a similar logic at 
work in the figure of suiciding lovers: “The joint suicide is one of the mythi-
co-literary figures of this logic of communion in immanence. Faced with this 
figure, one cannot tell which – the communion or the love – serves as a mod-
el for the other in death. In reality, with the immanence of the two lovers, 
death accomplishes the infinite reciprocity of two agencies: impassioned love 
conceived on the basis of Christian communion, and community thought 
according to the principle of love” (“The Inoperative Community,” 12).  
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conceptual distinctions between love/community and death/sacrifice; 
all are fused together in the orgiastic image of communion. Compare 
this with the following from Nancy: 
 
Properly speaking, there is no laceration of the singular 
being: there is no open cut in which the inside would get 
lost in the outside (which would presuppose an initial 
“inside,” an interiority). The laceration that, for Bataille, is 
exemplary, the woman’s “breach,” is ultimately not a 
laceration to the outside. (While the obsession with the 
breach in Bataille’s text indeed indicates something of the 
unbearable extremity at which communication comes into 
play, it also betrays an involuntarily metaphysical reference 
to an order of interiority and immanence, and to a 
condition involving the passage of one being into an other, 
rather than the passage of one through the exposed limit of 
the other.)45 
 
The difference is subtle but absolutely essential. For Nancy, Bataille 
was (involuntarily) metaphysical to the extent that he was wedded to 
the opposition between interiority and exteriority (such that, for 
instance, lovers would be engaged in an absolute desire to sacrifice 
the former for the latter). This is the significance of the breach, the 
laceration, and the wound in Bataille’s thinking: for him, these are 
points of entry and openness, points at which the integrity of the self is 
threatened with the dissolution that fascinated him. For Nancy, on 
the other hand, exteriority goes all the way down:46 as we saw, it is not 
that love breaks into the self, violating its integrity; rather it reveals it 
as always already broken. Nancy’s thought of love retains from 
                                                                                                 
45 “The Inoperative Community,” 30. 
46 As Nancy writes in an essay included in the artist’s book released with 
Phillip Warnell’s film Outlandish: “The body doesn’t contain anything, neither 
a spirit that couldn’t be contained nor an interiority specific to the body, since 
the body itself is nothing but the multiply folded surface of the ex-position or 
ek-sistence that it is . . . All the way down to its guts, in its muscle fiber and 
through its irrigation channels, the body exposes itself, it exposes to the out-
side the inside that keeps escaping always farther away, farther down the 
abyss that it is” (Nancy’s “Strange Foreign Bodies,” 18). Perhaps this is the 
significance of the central image of Warnell’s film: a live octopus in a tank of 
water positioned at the stern of a boat in choppy seas.    
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Bataille the sense that it exposes a certain ‘unbearable extremity,’ but 
jettisons his sacrificial metaphysics of the void. This is what he means 
when he writes: “[t]here is nothing behind singularity.”47 Nancy thus 
refuses the idea, still at work in Bataille, that lovers are “lost in a 
convulsion that binds them together,”48 that in the act of love there is 
a dissolution and reconstitution, an overcoming of a prior separation. 
As he writes: “In love, there is melee without assimilation or 
laceration. There is body one in each other and one to each other 
without incorporation or decorporation. Love is the melee of two 
bodies that would avoid all the traps of one.”49 Retrieving love from 
the sacrificial register in this way, Nancy is able to extract it from the 
paradigm of death. This, in turn, allows for a thought of community 
that would not therefore be reducible to the metaphysics of 
communion. Love is not the principle of community; it is another 
modality of the exposure of the finitude that is shared in community. 
And what is shared is not the void but groundlessness: the pure 
gratuity of a world without principle.    
Given Bataille’s fierce atheism, it is perhaps ironic that Nancy 
links the project of communal fusion that tempted him with 
Christianity, arguing that the fascist project represented a “convulsion 
of Christianity,”50 and claiming that “the true consciousness of the 
loss of community is Christian . . . communion takes place, in its 
principle as in its ends, at the heart of the mystical body of Christ.”51 
But of course, this should not surprise us, because the Eucharist is 
obviously the exemplary model for understanding community 
according to a logic of love that would always already be a logic of 
sacrifice: community as incorporation, as participation in a single 
body. In that sense, Nancy’s project can be understood as intervening 
into the metaphysics of Christianity so as to release something from it 
(which is to say that he was engaged in the deconstruction of 
Christianity well before Dis-Enclosure). This will underline the 
significance of the thought of love available in “L’amour en éclats,” 
which turns more than once to the philosophical question raised by 
the Christian equation between God and love (Nancy argues, for 
                                                                                                 
47 “The Inoperative Community,” 27. 
48 “College of Sociology,” 250. 
49 “Strange Foreign Bodies, 17-18 (translation modified). 
50 “The Inoperative Community,” 17. 
51 “The Inoperative Community,” 10. 
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instance, that “God is love” provides the model for “thinking is love” 
(86; 228f)). If it is true that I can only love that which is finite, then it 
follows that the very idea of a universal love for ‘everyone’ is 
incoherent. If there is any sense in the command to love one’s 
neighbor, then, it will consist in the fact that the neighbor resists 
becoming a representative of abstract ‘humanity.’52 Similarly, if there 
is a love for being, it will be because there is no such thing as 
‘everything,’ because being does not exist except here and here.53 In the 
terms of Nancy’s essay, it will be because the essence of being is 
“something like a heart – that is to say: that which alone is capable of 
love” (88; 234f).  
Love’s uncertain light shows being not as a brute totality, but 
exposes it as singular and plural, completely incomplete. I cannot love 
being in general, and I cannot love everyone. But perhaps – there is 
no guaranteeing it – I can love this being, this one.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                 
52 Slavoj Žižek argues that the realisation of universal love is plagued by ex-
ceptions for this very reason (see “Neighbors and Other Monsters,” 182-3). 
53 This finitude arguably also forms the (erotic) condition of the possibility of 
commentary. Commentary is a mode (or shard) of love because it exposes 
the finitude of a text in exposing the real infinity of the task that it sets for 
itself: the fact that one can never completely fill the margin. The text always, 
as Zarathustra proclaims of all great loves, wants more. Of course, that there is 
always more to say means not only that one can never say enough (as the 
pseudo-poet proclaims when he bemoans the inadequacy of language in the 
face of his beloved), but also that one cannot say everything: just as I can 
only love because I can’t love everyone, I can only write because I can’t write 
everything.  
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